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For the eighty thousand natives of Alaska (Indians, Eskimos and Aleuts),
passage of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 (ANCSA)' consti-
tuted a triumph over long-time governmental inertia. With increasing
urgency, 2 the natives had pressed their claims of aboriginal title to virtually all
the 375 million acres of land within the state. While Congress proved nomi-
nally willing to preserve such claims, 3 almost a century had elapsed without
action to confirm or extinguish them. 4 By 1969-1970, however, the rapidly
escalating rate of economic development in Alaska, combined initially with
pressure from a more sympathetic administration,5 impelled a reluctant state
* Member, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, Washington, D.C. Mr. Lazarus rep-
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legal consultant to both the Alaska Federation of Natives and the Alaska Native Foundation.
t Associate Attorney, Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Kampelman, Washington, D.C. Mr.
West is a member of the Southern Cheyenne and Arapaho Tribes of Oklahoma.
I. Act of December 18, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1601
(Supp. IV, 1974)). The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971 will be referred to hereinaf-
ter as the "Claims Act" or "ANCSA." Throughout, reference and quotation will be to the original
sections of the Claims Act as embodied in 85 Stat. 688 while citation will be to the present
codification of the Claims Act in 43 U.S.C. § 1601.
2. Absent federal recognition of their aboriginal rights, the natives faced a constant danger
that the United States could (and might) dispose of the lands they claimed without incurring even
the obligation to pay just compensation. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272
(1955).
3. See Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508, 72 Stat. 339; Act of June 6, 1900, ch. 786, 31
Stat. 321; Act of May 14, 1898, ch. 299, 30 Stat. 409; Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989;
Act of May 17, 1884, ch. 53, § 8, 23 Stat. 24; Lazarus, Native Land Claims in Alaska, 7 AM. INDIAN
39 (1958).
4. The Indian Claims Commission Act, which was enacted in 1946, has served as the principal
legislative vehicle for settling the claims of Indians against the United States. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 70 (1970). This legislation, however, has not been utilized by Alaska Natives for the reasons
noted by the House of Representatives in its report on the House version of the Claims Act:
The Indian Claims Commission has not been available to the Natives in Alaska, in a
practical sense, because the great bulk of the aboriginal titles claimed by the Natives have
not been taken or extinguished by the United States. The United States has simply not
acted.
H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971).
5. In response to native requests, supported by such Indian-interest organizations as the As-
sociation on American Indian Affairs, Inc., Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall in late 1966
imposed an informal and unannounced moratorium upon the patenting of lands selected by the
state pursuant to section 6 of the Alaska Statehood Act. Act of July 7, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-508,
72 Stat. 339. Before leaving office, Secretary Udall issued Public Land Order No. 4582, 34 Fed.
Reg. 1025 (1969), formally withdrawing all unreserved public lands in Alaska from disposition
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and, subsequently, private industry to join the natives in seeking a com-
prehensive legislative determination of their land rights.6 The Claims Act
soon followed.
The victory for the native cause achieved through ANCSA was over-
whelming, both comparatively and absolutely. In June 1967, Secretary of the
Interior Stewart L. Udall recommended to Congress a legislative settlement
which included the grant of trust title in up to fifty thousand acres for each
native village (a maximum of about ten million acres) and authorization for
the Alaska Attorney General to sue for the value of any remaining native
lands at 1867 prices.7 By July 1969, Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel
had raised the administration's suggested price for the extinguishment of na-
tive claims to $500 million and ownership of up to ten million acres.' Under
the Claims Act, the natives in fact will receive fee title to over forty million
acres of land, payments from the United States Treasury of $462.5 million
over an eleven year period, and a royalty of two per cent up to a ceiling of
$500 million on mineral development in Alaska.9 This settlement provides far
more money and leaves far more land in native ownership than any previous
treaty, agreement, or statute for the extinguishment of aboriginal title in our
nation's history.
In addition to funds and resources, however, the Claims Act presents the
natives of Alaska with a unique challenge. Rejecting traditional federal-Indian
relationships, Congress directed that the settlement be administered through
corporations organized under state law, and defined the precise manner in
which native funds and income from native property were to be allocated. 10
Within this statutory framework, though, the natives retain relatively unfet-
tered control over their assets, and are free from Bureau of Indian Affairs
supervision."1 ANCSA thus reflects a new departure in government dealings
pending a determination of native rights, and during the course of his confirmation hearings
Secretary-designate Walter J. Hickel, former Governor of Alaska, agreed to honor the Udall
"land freeze" for two years.
6. See generalv, M. BERRY, THE ALASKA PIPELINE: THE POLITICS or" OIL AND NATIVE LAND
CLAIMS (1975). The switch in the state's position from opposition to native land claims legislation
and the subsequent change in industry attitudes fron indifference to active support stemmed in
substantial part from native successes in the courts. Specifically, in Alaska v,. Udall, 420 F.2d 938
(9th Cir. 1969), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in rejecting a state attack upon the
Validity of the land freeze, ruled that lands claimed by the natives could not be deemed, as a
matter of law, "vacant, unappropriated, and unreserved- and thus subject to selection under the
Statehood Act. In Native Village of Allakaket v. Hickel, Civil No. 706-70 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 18,
1972), the District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined construction of the Alaska pipeline
across native lands.
7. U.S. Dep't of Interior, News Release (June 16, 1967) (on file with authors).
8. See generallv Senate Interior Comm. Amendment No. 112, in Hearings on S. 1830 Before the
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 197-98 (1969).
9. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a), 1608, 1611, 1612 (Supp. IV, 1974).
10. Id. §§ 1606(d), 1607(a).
11. The settlement is to be effected "withotit establishing any permanent racially defined in-
stitutions, rights, privilges, or obligations, wvithotit creating a reservation system or lengthy ward-
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with Indians-a policy which places on the natives alone the crucial task of
translating the immediate benefits of the settlement into permanent, socially
and economically productive enterprises.
Unfortunately, the language of the Claims Act frequently is ambiguous,
and serious difficulties already have arisen in its implementation. The object
of this article is to identify those major legal problems which have surfaced to
date, to suggest possible answers to some of the crucial issues, and to discuss
whether the provisions of ANCSA offer the natives a reasonable chance of
meeting the law's challenge.
I
THE PRINCIPAL PROVISIONS OF THE CLAIMS ACT
The Claims Act not only effected a comprehensive legislative settlement of
all aboriginal land titles and claims,'" it also enabled Alaska to resume land
selections under the Statehood Act, 3 and removed a major legal obstacle to
construction of the Alaska pipeline and a potential cloud upon the titles of all
non-natives claiming rights to land in the state under federal law. What the
natives received, or were required to do in return, is summarized below.
A. The Native Corporations
Pursuant to section 7(a) of the Claims Act, the Secretary of the Interior
divided the State of Alaska into twelve geographic regions composed, as far as
practicable, of natives having a common heritage and sharing common in-
terests. In order to qualify for benefits under ANCSA, the natives of a par-
ticular region first had to organize a Regional Corporation under the "busi-
ship or trusteeship, and without adding to the categories of property and institutions enjoying
special tax privileges .... " Id. § 1601(b).
12. Id. § 1603. The legal and factual background of the settlement is set forth in S. REP. No.
405, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 71-83, 88-89 (1971). See also H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 3-6
(1971); H.R. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1971).
Courts, however, have noted certain exceptions to the proposition that the Claims Act settled
all Alaska Native claims based upon aboriginal title. In Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359
(D.D.C. 1973), the Arctic Slope Native Association sued the Secretary of the Interior to recover
damages caused by the United States' allegedly unlawful transfer of native lands to the State of
Alaska, and for its purportedly illegal authorization of certain third-party trespasses on the na-
tives' lands. The defendant mov ed for summary judgment on the ground that such claims had
been extinguished by section 4 of the Claims Act. See 43 U.S.C. § 1603 (Supp. IV, 1974). The
district court rejected the government's defense, and held that ANCSA had not effected an ex-
tinguishment of native claims based on defendant's "pre-Settlement Act trespasses." Edwardsen v.
Morton, supra at 1379.
Legislation was introduced in the Ninety-fourth Congress which was directed towards overrul-
ing the Edwardsen case by anending section 4 of ANCSA to include the trespass claim alleged by
the Arctic Slope Native Association. See S. 1824, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 15(b) (1975). The pro-
posed legislation, however, was not included in the Claims Act amendments ultimately enacted by
Congress. See Act of January 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-204, 89 Stat. 1145.
13. See notes 5, 6 supra.
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ness for profit" laws of the State of Alaska.' 4 Section 7(g) of the Claims Act
provides that each "Regional Corporation shall be authorized to. issue such
number of shares of common stock, divided into such classes of shares as may
be specified in the articles of incorporation to reflect the provisions of this
Act, as may be needed to issue one hundred shares of stock to each Native
enrolled in the region .... ,,,5 Until December 18, 1991, stock in the Regional
Corporations is subject to a restriction upon alienation and carries voting
rights only if the holder is a native.
Within each region, eligible native villages must also organize under state
corporation laws before receiving benefits under the Act.'" These Village
Corporations are neither stockholders in nor subsidiaries of the Regional
Corporations, 7 but the Claims Act nonetheless requires the Regional Corpo-
rations to supervise the redistribution to Village Corporations of monies re-
ceived from the Alaska Native Fund and from timber and mineral
resources,' 8 to withhold money until acceptable plans have been approved by
the Regional Corporation for the use of distributable funds,19 and to review
and approve the articles of incorporation, including proposed amendments
and annual budgets of the Village Corporations for a period of five years."'
14. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1606(d), 1607(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). Section 7(c) of ANCSA, 43 U.S.C.
§ 1606(c), provides that, "[i]f a majority of all eligible Natives eighteen years of age or older who
are not permanent residents of Alaska elect . . . to be enrolled in a thirteenth region . . . the
Secretary shall establish such a region for the benefit of the Natives who elected to be enrolled
therein, and they may establish a Regional Corporation . The Secretary ruled that a majority
of the adult natives who are nonresidents of Alaska did not elect to form a thirteenth region, but
his determination has been overturned by a federal district court, and a thirteenth Regional
Corporation was organized on January 1, 1976. Alaska Native Ass'n of Oregon v. Morton, Civil
No. 2133-73; Alaska Fed'n of Natives Int'l v. Morton, Civil No. 2141-73 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 30,
1974). Moreover, the district court's decision was confirmed by the Act of January 2, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-204, § 8, 89 Stat. 1145, 1149.
15. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(g) (Supp. IV, 1974).
16. Id. § 1607(a). At the present time all of the more than two hundred native villages in
Alaska certified by the Secretary of the Interior as eligible for benefits under the Act have or-
ganized as business corporations pursuant to Alaska law.
17. All of the stockholders of a Village Corporation also are stockholders of the Regional
Corporation for their region, but only some of the stockholders of the Regional Corporation will
be stockholders of any particular Village Corporation. Under the Claims Act, the Village Corpo-
rations do not own stock of the Regional Corporation, and the Regional Corporation does not
own stock of the Village Corporations.
18. 43 U.S.C. § 160 6 (j) (Supp. IV, 1974). See text at notes 7-8, 10-11 supra.
19. A Regional Corporation may withhold money otherwise distributable to a Village Corpo-
ration
until the village has submitted a plan for the use of the money that is satisfactory to the
Regional Corporation . .. (and] may require a village plan to provide for joint ventures
with other villages, and for joint financing of projects undertaken by the Regional Cor-
poration that will benefit the region generally.
43 U.S.C. § 1606(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
20. Id. § 1607(b). This vesting of authority in one set of private corporations over the busi-
ness, assets, and affairs of a second independent set of private corporations appears un-
precedented in the annals of American legal history.
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B. The Alaska Native Fund
Section 6 of the Claims Act establishes in the United States Treasury an
Alaska Native Fund 2' into which money from two major sources is to be de-
posited. The Fund is to receive federal appropriations in the total amount of
$462,500,000 over an eleven year period beginning with the fiscal year 1972,
the year during which the Act became effective. In addition, a share in the
amount of two per cent of specified federal and state mineral revenues is to be
paid into the Fund, without regard to any time limitations, until such pay-
ments reach $500 million. 22
Section 6(c) of the Claims Act provides that, after completion of a native
roll by the Secretary, all money in the Fund "shall be distributed at the end of
each three months of the fiscal year among the Regional Corporations or-
ganized pursuant to section 7 on the basis of the relative numbers of Natives
enrolled in each region.123 Pursuant to section 7(j) of ANCSA, however, dur-
ing the first five years following enactment, not less than 10 per cent of all
money received by the Regional Corporations from the Fund must be distrib-
uted among their stockholders and, in addition, not less than 45 per cent of
such money during the first five year period and 50 per cent thereafter is to
be distributed by the Regional Corporations to Village Corporations and to
the class of regional stockholders who are not residents of native villages
which have organized Village Corporations. 24 Thus, ANCSA specifically man-
dates that initially at least 55 per cent, and subsequently at least 50 per cent,
of all money distributed from the Fund to Regional Corporations shall be
redistributed to their stockholders, to non-residents of villages, and to Village
Corporations.
C. Land Entitlement Under the Claims Act
Pursuant to section 1 l(a) of the Act, the Secretary of the Interior has
withdrawn over one hundred million acres of "public lands"125 in Alaska "from
21. Id. § 1605. [Hereinafter the Alaska Native Fund will be referred to as "Fund."]
22. Id. § 1608.
23. Id. § 1605(c). The final roll was certified by the Secretary of the Interior on December 18,
1973, and the balance of the money then held in the Fund was distributed to the Regional
Corporations immediately thereafter. Previously, the corporations had received small advances
from the Fund pursuant to special congressional authorization in order to conduct necessary
business activities. See Second Supplemental Appropriations Act of May 27, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-306, 86 Stat. 163, 167; Interior Dep't Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30,
1973, Pub. L. No. 92-369, 86 Stat. 508, 510. The roll was ordered reopened by the Act of January
2, 1976, supra note 14, to accommodate those natives who missed the filing deadline.
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j) (Supp. IV, 1974).
25. "Public lands" are defined in section 3(e) of ANCSA as
all Federal lands and interests therein in Alaska except: (1) the smallest practicable tract,
as determined by the Secretary, enclosing land actually used in connection with the ad-
ministration of any Federal installation, and (2) land selections of the State of Alaska
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all forms of appropriation under the public land laws, including the mining
and mineral leasing laws, and from selection under the Alaska Statehood Act
.... 2 Village Corporations had the collective right, before December 18,
1974, to select up to twenty-two million acres from the lands so withdrawn,
with the exact land entitlement of each village being dependent upon its
population. 27 The difference between the acreage actually selected by Village
Corporations and the authorized twenty-two million acres is to be allocated by
the Secretary among eleven Regional Corporations (excluding southeastern
Alaska) on the basis of the number of natives enrolled in each region, and
then is to be reallocated by the Regional Corporations to the villages "on an
equitable basis after considering historic use, subsistence needs, and
population."2 8 The Village Corporations will receive a fee simple "patent to
the surface estate in the lands selected,"' 9 while the Secretary of the Interior
is directed to "issue to the Regional Corporation for the region in which the
lands are located a patent to the subsurface estate in such lands .... -31 The
Act also provided that Regional Corporations could obtain title to an addi-
tional sixteen million acres of land selected prior to December 18, 1975 from
withdrawn public lands.
3 1
which have been patented or tentatively approved under section 6(g) of the Alaska
Statehood Act, as amended . . . or identified for selection by the State prior to January
17, 1969.
Id. § 1602(e).
26. Id. § 1610(a).
27. Id. §§ 1611(a), 1615(a). In villages outside southeast Alaska, the Village Corporations are
entitled to select a minimnum of three townships (69,120 acres) for a population between twenty-
five and ninety-nine and a maximum of seven townships (161,280 acres) for a population over
600. Id. § 1613(a). All villages in southeastern Alaska are limited to land selections of one town-
ship (23,040 acres), regardless of population. Id. § 1613(b).
28. Id. § 1611(b).
29. Id. §§ 1613(a), 1613(b).
30. Id. § 1613(f).
31. Id. § 1611(c). Sealaska Corporation, organized by the natives of southeastern Alaska, and
the thirteenth Regional Corporation, which will be organized under section 7(c) of the Claims
Act, see note 14 supra, are not entitled to make these section 12(c) selections. In addition, since
eligibility for section 12(c) selections is determined on a land-loss formula, only six Regional Cor-
porations actually so qualify.
In exercising rights under section 12(c), lands withdrawn pursuant to subsection I l(a)(1) nsust
be selected before lands withdrawn pursuant to subsection II (a)(3) may be selected, provided that
"within the lands withdrawn by subsection I1 (a)( 1) the Regional Corporation may select only even
numbered townships in even numbered ranges, and only odd numbered townships in odd nun-
bered ranges." 43 U.S.C. § 1611(c) (Stpp. IV. 1974). The purpose of this provision was to pre-
vent native corporations in combination from controlling large, solid blocks of land.
Section 14(c) provides that "[i]nmediately after selection by a Regional Corporation, the Sec-
retary shall convey to the Corporation title to the surface and/or the subsurface estates, as is
appropriate, in the lands selected." Id. § 1613(e). As a practical matter, the Bureau of Land
Management will not be able to complete the required survey of native land selections for de-
cades, so the Secretary will have difficulty in issuing a patent promptly. In recognition of this
fact, the land selection regulations provide for issuance of interim conveyances. 43 C.F.R.
§ 2650.0-5(h) (1974).
Page 132: Winter 1976]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Although Regional Corporations will receive full title to their own land
selections and a fee simple patent to the subsurface estate under lands
selected by native villages, groups, and individuals, ANCSA further provides
that these corporations will not enjoy the entire benefit of this property. Sec-
tion 7(i) of the Claims Act requires that each Regional Corporation divide
among all twelve Regional Corporations on an annual basis 70 per cent of the
revenues derived from the timber resources and subsurface estate patented to
it.3 2 Moreover, as in the case of the Fund, section 7(j) provides that, during
the five years following enactmefnt, not less than 10 per cent of all funds
received by a Regional Corporation under section 7(i) must be distributed
among its stockholders and, in addition, not less than 45 per cent of such
revenues during the first five year period, and 50 per cent thereafter, shall be
distributed by the Regional Corporation to Village Corporations established in
its region, and to the class of its stockholders who are not residents of native
villages having organized Village Corporations.3 3 Thus, ANCSA vests substan-
tial real property interests in the Regional Corporation, but further dictates
that each Regional Corporation must share its revenues from timber and sub-
surface resources with other Regional Corporations, Village Corporations,
and certain stockholders.
II
A SURVEY OF ISSUES WHICH HAVE ARISEN
IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CLAIMS ACT
Implementation of the Alaska Native claims settlement scheme has already
produced a significant number of troublesome questions concerning the scope
and meaning of its provisions. A new statute-especially one as complicated
and unique as the Claims Act-is under the best of circumstances bound to
produce problems of interpretation, but in the case of ANCSA this problem
has been complicated by the frequent ambiguity of its language and the rela-
tive dearth of revealing legislative history. Moreover, as the following discus-
sion will show, the executive agencies to which issues arising under ANCSA
have been presented are not responding with the cooperative spirit and sym-
pathetic understanding to which the natives are entitled.
The Regional Corporations also possess a land entitlement under section 14(h) of ANCSA
which is not to exceed two million acres, including the subsurface estate beneath lands patented
to native groups and individuals. 43 U.S.C. § 1613(h) (Supp. IV, 1974).
32. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i) (Supp. IV, 1974).
33. Id. § 1606(j).
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A. Threshold Questions-Village Eligibility and the
Boundaries of Regional Corporations
Although the Act listed 205 native villages as presumptively eligible for
land selections and monetary benefits3 4 the Secretary of the Interior was em-
powered to add other villages to the list 35 and, more importantly, declare
ineligible any village with less than twenty-five native residents or one pos-
sessing a modern, urban character the majority of whose residents are
non-native.36
The federal regulations implementing these provisions were written, as the
natives had requested, with an eye towards favoring village eligibility .3  Thus,
building upon the previously issued enrollment regulations which equated
"residence" with domicile,38 a key paragraph of the village eligibility regula-
tions provided that, for purposes of finding twenty-five or more native resi-
dents in a village, a "Native properly enrolled to the village shall be deemed a
resident of the village.139 Although the regulations required that a village pos-
sess "an identifiable physical location," that location need be evidenced only
by "occupancy consistent with the Natives' own cultural patterns and life style"
and through use by as few as thirteen natives during 1970.40 Finally, the
34. Id. §§ 1610(b)(l), 1615(a).
35. Id. § 1610(b)(3).
36. Id. § 1610(b)(2). Native villages determined to be ineligible by the Secretary are still enti-
tled, pursuant to section 14(h) of ANCSA, to receive some lands as native groups. See id.
§ 1613(h).
37. The area of village eligibility served as the specific occasion for one of the more curious
interpretations of the Claims Act offered by the Office of the Solicitor of the Department of the
Interior. The Solicitor was asked to determine whether the Secretary of the Interior possessed
authority after June 18, 1974 to determine the eligibility of native villages for benefits under
ANCSA. Sections 1 l(b)(2) and I l(b)(3) provide that the Secretary shall make determinations con-
cerning village eligibility within two and a half years following the enactment of ANCSA.
Proponents of the position that the Secretary continued to have authority to decide eligibility
questions after June 18, 1974 relied on the established principle of Indian law that federal stat-
utes affecting the rights and affairs of Indians must be liberally construed in their favor. Squire
v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1, 2 (1956); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1930); Choate v.
Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 (1912). In order to escape this rule, the Solicitor gratuitously observed
that the Claims Act is not Indian legislation. Interior Dep't Sol. Op. M-36876, 81 Interior Dec.
316 (1974). The Solicitor subsequently "revised" his opinion on village eligibility and eliminated
(but did not officially withdraw) his gratuitous observation. Interior Dep't Sol. Op. M-36877 (Jan.
7, 1975), 82 Interior Dec. 15. Shortly thereafter, however, the Solicitor again construed the
Claims Act adversely to native property interests, as if ANCSA were a public land law and not
legislation for the benefit of Indians. See Interior Dep't Sol. Op. M-36880 (July 8, 1975), 82
Interior Dec. 325.
38. 25 C.F.R. § 43h.l(k) (1975).
39. 43 C.F.R. § 2651.2(b)(1) (1975).
40. Id. § 2651.2(b)(2). In order to preserve the eligibility of villages destroyed or abandoned
because of the 1964 Alaska earthquake and tidal wave, the regulations further provided that "no
village which is known as a traditional village shall be disqualified if it meets the other criteria
specified in this subsection by reason of having been temporarily unoccupied in 1970 because
of an act of God or government authority occurring within the preceding 10 years." Id.
§ 2651.2(b)(2).
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standards for determining that a village is urban and modern in character
were set too high to cover any native village.4 1
The Alaska Native Claims Appeal Board, which is empowered to pass on
questions of village eligibility, adopted the position that it had jurisdiction
to reconsider the residence of persons placed on the final roll approved by
the Secretary of the Interior.42 As a consequence, two listed villages (Pauloff
Harbor and Uyak) and eight unlisted villages challenged in court board deci-
sions denying their eligibility. 43 The significance of the village eligibility cases,
however, lies not in the substantive issues involved, but in the fact that the
natives' early exposure to administration of ANCSA led to rulings by a federal
agency which actually granted less than the law and the regulations seemed to
promise.
Similar difficulties have arisen in the determination of boundary disputes
between the Regional Corporations. When the Secretary, in December 1972,
directed that any dispute should be settled under the arbitration provisions of
the Act 4 4 "within 90 days from the receipt of this letter,' 45 several Regional
Corporations which were dissatisfied with the borders he had proposed
sought judicial relief compelling other Regional Corporations to submit
boundary questions to arbitration boards. 46 In almost all instances the Reg-
ional Corporation seeking an order for arbitration prevailed. Again, the sig-
nificance of the boundary dispute cases lies not in the substantive issues
involved, 47 but in the fact that the unity of purpose achieved by the natives
prior to passage of the Claims Act broke down so quickly after its enactment.
41. Id. § 265 1.2(b)(3).
42. See, e.g., In re Village of Afognak (1974) (appeal before the Alaska Native Claims Appeal
Board). Under the regulations, the Director of the Juneau Area Office, Bureau of Indian Affairs,
made the initial determination concerning eligibility, 43 C.F.R. § 2651.2(a)(4) (1975), but his deci-
sion was subject to appeal to the Alaska Native Claims Appeal Board. The decision of this ad hoc
board was submitted to the Secretary for his personal approval. Id. § 2651.2(a)(5).
43. In a memorandum and order handed down on November 14, 1975, a federal district
court upheld the eligibility of all the native villages. Koniag, Inc. v. Kleppe, 405 F. Supp. 1360
(D.D.C. 1975).
44. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(a) (Stipp. IV, 1974).
45. Letter fron Rogers C.B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior to John Borbridge, Dec. 11,
1972. In subsequent litigation concerning the arbitration of boundary disputes, the authority of
the Secretary of the Interior to establish administratively the ninety-day deadline was challenged
successfully. See Central Council of the Tlingit & Haida Indians v. Chugach Native Ass'n, 502
F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1974).
46. See, e.g., Central Council of the Tlingit & Haida Indians v. Chugach Native Ass'n, 502
F.2d at 1325; Ahtna, Inc. v. Dovon Ltd., Civil No. A-198-72 (D. Alas., filed Jan. 18, 1973). The
agreement entered into by Sealaska Corporation and the Chugach Native Association as a result
of the Tlingit and Haida Indians litigation has been confirmed by the Act of January 2, 1976, Pub.
L. No. 94-204, § 11, 89 Stat. 1145, 1150.
47. The location of a Regional Corporation's border obviously influences the number of na-
tives who will be considered as "enrolled" in the region for purposes of distributing land and
monetary benefits tinder ANCSA. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1605(c), 1606(i) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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B. Corporate and Tax Issues Relating to the Native Corporations
and to the Monetary Benefits Distributed Under the Claims Act
In administering and distributing the substantial monetary benefits con-
ferred on native corporations by the Claims Act, the Regional Corporations
have had to determine not only what the general tax consequences of ANCSA
are, but also how such consequences should be allocated between the Regional
and Village Corporations. Furthermore, provisions in the Act authorizing the
native corporations to distribute stock to their shareholders have raised obvi-
ous questions about the applicability of federal securities laws.
1. Tax Consequences Attaching to the Distribution of
Revenues and Moneys Under the Claims Act
Among the more important tax questions which have arisen under the
provisions of ANCSA 48 are the following: (1) whether money earned from the
Alaska Native Fund prior to distribution to the Regional Corporations is sub-
ject to federal income taxes upon receipt by the Regional Corporations and/or
upon redistribution to Village Corporations and individual natives under sec-
tion 7(j) of the Claims Act; (2) whether distributions which must be made by
Regional Corporations to the Village Corporations under sections 7(i) and 7(j)
of ANCSA should be taxed to the Regional or the Village Corporations; and
(3) whether income on mandatory distributions earned prior to distribution is
taxable to the Regional Corporation or the Village Corporation.
a. Interest or other earnings on Fund money before distribution
In accordance with section 6(a) of the Claims Act,49 Congress appropriated
$12,500,000 during fiscal year 1972, $50 million during fiscal year 1973, and
$70 million during fiscal year 1974 for deposit in the Alaska Native Fund."' A
small portion of this money was advanced to the Regional Corporations"i
while the balance earned interest either as a deposit in the United States
Treasury or a qualified bank until distribution to the Regional Corporations
on December 19, 1973.32 The Claims Act, its legislative history, and relevant
48. One such issue already has been eliminated by the Act of January 2, 1976, which effected
a number of corrective amendments to the Claims Act. See Act of January 2, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-204, § 13, 89 Stat. 1145, 1154. The 1976 Act amended section 21 of ANCSA to provide
explicitly that until January 1, 1992, the stock of any native corporation, including the right to
receive dividends from such stock, shall not be included in the gross estate of a decedent under
sections 2031 and 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code. See generally H.R. REP. No. 729, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975).
49. 43 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
50. See Act of Oct. 4, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-120, 87 Stat. 429, 431; Act of Aug. 10, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-369, 86 Stat. 508, 510; Act of May 27, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-306, 86 Stat. 163, 167.
51. See id.
52. Under date of December 28, 1973, the Comptroller General ruled that, upon certification
of the final native roll by the Secretary on December 18, 1973, Fund money lost its status as
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authorities all support the conclusion that the "interest" portion of Fund dis-
tributions to the Regional Corporations is not subject to federal income tax
upon receipt or upon distribution."3 Section 21(a) of the Claims Act provides
a tax exemption for "revenues" originating from the Fund, with no distinc-
tion drawn between principal and interest. 54 Section 6(c) of the Act directs
that, after completion of the native roll by the Secretary, "all money in the
Fund," with an exception not here material, "shall be distributed . . . among
the Regional Corporations," and such "money," which necessarily includes
both principal and accumulated interest, is the only revenue originating from
the Fund to which the statutory tax exemption possibly could relate. Only the
income earned from the investment of this revenue is subject to taxation.
Thus the statutory pattern, which is repeated in provisions affecting taxation
of native land, is to immunize native property from taxation until its receipt,
and thereafter to permit taxation of the income from these assets "to the same
extent as such revenues or proceeds are taxable when received by a non-
native individual or corporation. 15 5 Indeed, since the Village and Regional
Corporations are treated as Indian tribes for purposes of the interest earned
on the deposit of their funds,56 and since Indian tribes are not entities subject
"tribal funds" and no longer would qualify for interest-bearing deposit pursuant to 25 U.S.C. §§
161a, 162a (1970). In passing the Act of January 2, 1976, Congress effectively overruled the
Comptroller General. See Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-204, § 5, 89 Stat. 1145, 1147. For
purposes of sections 161 a and 162a, the Alaska Native Fund now shall be considered Indian trust
moneys until the date on which distributions are made from the Fund under section 6(c) of the
Claims Act.
53. Nonetheless, the question has been pending before the Internal Revenue Service since
May 1974. IRS's unreasonable delay in responding to the request for tax rulings typifies the
natives frustration with federal agencies in trying to make ANCSA work.
54. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(a) (Supp. IV, 1974). In substance, the Alaska Native Fund is indistin-
guishable from any of the numerous judgment funds deposited in the Treasury to the credit of
Indian groups. Distributions of principal and interest from these funds have also been declared
to be tax exempt. Act of Oct. 19, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-134, 87 Stat. 466, 468 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 1407 (Supp. IV, 1974)).
55. 43 U.S.C. § 1620(d) (Supp. IV, 1974). The legislative history of ANCSA lends additional
support to the conclusion that interest earned upon Fund money prior to distribution to the
Regional Corporations is not subject to federal income taxes upon such distribution. Vhereas the
Act does not expressly provide for the payment of interest on money actually appropriated and
deposited in the Treasury. section 6(a)(2) does call for the payment of four per cent interest
upon money authorized to be appropriated which in fact is not appropriated within six months
after the fiscal year during which the money was payable. In explaining the former omission.
Senator Bible, the Floor Manager of the Conference Report, declared in response to a question
from Alaskan Senator Gravel:
[I]t is the conmittee's intention that the Secretary of the Treasury shall use his existing
statutory authoritv to invest and manage the Alaska Native Fund pending enrollment
and to credit any interest so earned to that fund. When the enrollment is completed, the
total balance, including accriued interest Will be paird to rgional corportions in accordance with
the bill.
117 CO(NG. REc. 46967 (1971) (statement of Senator Alan Bible) (emphasis added).
56. Letter from Ehner B. Staats. Comptroller General of the United States to Rogers C.B.
Morton, Secretary of the Interior 6. October 3I. 1972.
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to income tax statutes,5" it follows that the interest or other income earned
upon Fund money during the period before distribution to the Regional Cor-
porations should not be subject to federal income tax upon receipt by the
Regional Corporations or, following partial redistribution pursuant to section
7(j) of ANCSA, upon receipt by stockholders, Village Corporations, and non-
village residents.5"
b. Distributions mandated by the Claims Act
Section 7(i) of ANCSA requires the distribution to all twelve Regional
Corporations of 70 per cent of the revenues which a Regional Corporation
receives from the disposition of its timber resources and subsurface estate.,'
Furthermore, Regional Corporations are directed by section 7(j) to distribute
to their stockholders, to Village Corporations in their region, and to certain
nonvillage residents a portion of the funds and revenues which the Regional
Corporations receive under sections 6(c) and 7(i)."' These statutory provisions
establish the basic pattern for the allocation of Fund money, resource re-
venues, and certain other income tinder ANCSA. The intent of Congress
plainly was to accord all natives a meaningful stake in the land claims settle-
ment, either directly or through a two-tier structure of Regional and Village
Corporations which they were to own.
The (1uestion that arises-and upon which neither the Internal Revenue
Service nor the courts have yet ruled-is whether income which the Regional
Corporations must distribute to Village Corporations and individual natives
Under the Claims Act is taxable to the Regional Corporations or the ultimate
distributees, or possibly both. The language of the Claims Act is clear in that
Regional Corporations do not take funds, revenues, or other income which
the law mandates be shared or redistributed"' as beneficial owners or even
under a claim of right, but instead are mere conduits, the instruments chosen
by Congress to receive and pass along funds which the federal government
would have practical difficulties in itself disbursing. The courts have,
moreover, repeatedly held that taxes may not be charged against one who has
no right to retain the income earned.'62 Therefore, the Regional Corporations
57. Rev. Rul. 284, 1967-2 Cumi. BULL. 55, 58.
58. Revten e Ruling 67-284. of course, further states that [tlribal income not otherwise ex-
empt from Federal income tax is includible in the gross income of the Indian tribal member
when distributed or constructively received by him." The potential application of this rule to the
interest portion of the 10 per cent distribution from the Fund money to individual natives, how-
ever, is precluded by section 21 (a) of ANCSA.
59. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i) (Supp. IV, 1974).
60. Id. § 1606(j).
61. See Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953).
62. See. e.g.. Commissioner v. Brown, 54 F.2d 563 (1st Cir. 1931), cert. denied, Burnet v.
Brown, 286 U.S. 556 (1932); Seven-up Co., 14 T.C. 965 (1950), acquiesced in, 1950-2 Cum. BULL.
4. See also Ford Dealers Advertising Fund, Inc., 55 T.C. 761 (1971), qfrd, 456 F.2d 255 (5th
Page 132: Winter 1976]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
should not be subject to federal income tax with respect to any revenues
which must be distributed to other Regional Corporations pursuant to section
7(i) of the Act, or with respect to any funds, revenues, or other income which
must be distributed under section 7(j) to their stockholders, to Village Corpo-
rations, and to the class of their stockholders who are not village residents. 3
c. Earnings upon mandated distributions
ANCSA is silent as to when or how frequently the Regional Corporations
are required to distribute funds in accordance with section 7(j), and is equally
unrevealing concerning the powers or responsibilities of the Regional Corpo-
rations to invest withheld funds. However, after receipt of a Fund distri-
bution,64 or a resource revenue sharing payment pursuant to section 7(i),65
the Regional Corporations as a practical matter will need thirty to sixty days
to up-date their books and process checks effecting a redistribution of the
money to Village Corporations and individual native stockholders. At least
three sets of circumstances also exist under which the Regional Corporations
may be well advised temporarily to withhold redistribution of some or all of
such receipts for an even longer period:
(1) The Village Corporations and individual natives may be entitled to a
distribution of resource revenues and Fund money at approximately the same
time, so that two distributions could be combined if one were briefly delayed.
Cir. 1972); Broadcast Measurement Bureau, Inc., 16 T.C. 988 (1951), acquiesced in, 1951-2 CuM.
BULL. 2.
63. Section 7(m) of the Act provides that, '[w]hen funds are distributed among Village Cor-
porations in a region, an amount . . . shall be distributed as dividends to the class of stockholders
who are not residents of those villages." and a question thus may arise as to whether at least the
money so paid out as "dividends," including, in particular, the distributable portion of -all other
net income" Under section 7(j), should be included in the gross income of the Regional Corpora-
tions. In this regard, Congress appears to have used the term "dividends" in section 7(m) in its
primary sense as "an individual share of something distributed among a number of recipients,"
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 633 (1966); BLACk's LAW DICTIONARY 565
(4th ed. 1968), and not as the word is specially defined under section 316 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 316.
First, the language of the Act makes clear that village nonresidents receive payments Under
section 7(m) not because they are stockholders of a Regional Corporation, but rather because
they are not stockholders of a Village Corporation. Second. section 7(j) directs the Regional Cor-
porations to distribute 45 to 50 per cent of certain revenues to Village Corporations and non-
village residents regardless of whether the Regional Corporations. in the light of all their
activities, have "earnings and profits"; under section 316 of the Code, on the other hand, a
dividend by definition must be derived from "earnings and profits." Finally, section 21(a) of
ANCSA clothes Fund income with a tax exemption upon receipt by an 'individual Native
through dividend distributions," a clear congressional use of the word "dividend" in a context
where the meaning that this term possesses under section 316 of the Code could not possibly
have been intended.
64. Under section 6(c) of ANCSA, distributions from the Fund are made on a quarterlv basis.
See 43 U.S.C. § 16 05(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
65. Resource revenues under section 7(i) will be distributed twice a year, at the end of the
calendar year in some cases and at the end of a June 30 fiscal year for all other Regional Corpo-
rations. See id. § 1606(i).
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(2) A Fund distribution or resource revenue payment may be so small as
to make immediate redistribution economically undesirable, especially to indi-
vidual natives. This situation is likely with respect to three out of every four
Fund distributions during early years, when no appropriated money will have
been deposited and, as is now the case, the contributions from the two per
cent royalty under section 9 of ANCSA remain relatively low.66
(3) Under section 7(1) of the Act, a Regional Corporation is empowered to
withhold section 7(j) distributions to a Village Corporation "until the village
has submitted a plan for use of the money that is satisfactory to the Regional
Corporation."
The Regional Corporations originally placed 55 per cent of the December
19, 1973 Fund distribution, and will continue to place 55 to 50 per cent, as
the case may be, of future Fund money and resource revenue payments, in
interest-bearing deposits or short-term investments pending redistribution of
the money to the Village Corporations and individual native stockholders.
Since section 21(a) of the Act provides that the tax exemption accorded rev-
enues originating from the Alaska Native Fund "shall not apply to income
from the investment of such revenues," and since ANCSA contains no special
tax exemption for resource revenues, the question arises as to whether in-
come earned upon the distributable portion of these funds is attributable for
tax purposes to the Regional Corporations.
Case law and a published ruling of the Internal Revenue Service both
stand for the proposition that interest or other earnings upon money which
the Regional Corporations must distribute to Village Corporations and indi-
vidual natives in accordance with section 7(j) of the Act is not income of the
Regional Corporations. In Rupe Investment Corporation v. Commissioner, 7 the
court held that an investment banker possessing stock as a conduit between a
buyer and seller was not entitled to claim a dividends-received credit, the
overriding principle being that such income will be attributed to the beneficial
owner of the underlying asset. Furthermore, in Revenue Ruling 69-96,8 the
Service determined that annual dividends received (and used to reduce future
premiums) on a group credit life insurance policy, which was administered by
a farm production credit association for the benefit of its member-borrowers,
were not income to the association since it was acting solely as an agent in
handling the dividends. 9 Similarly, interest or other income earned during
66. Under section 7(j), Regional Corporations are required to distribute to natives 10 per cent
of royalties received under section 9 of the Act. The distribution of March 31. 1974, foir example,
amounted to 71 cents per native.
67. 266 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1959).
68. 1969-1 Ceum. BULL. 3i.
69. In Revenue Ruling 69-96, the Service emphasized that the association's books mist
"clearly establish that it is acting as a mere trustee or conduit" with respect to dividend paynents.
Rev. Rul. 96, 1969-1 Cum. BULL. 32. The books and records of the Regional Corporations clearly
establish their position as conduits of the statutorily mandated distributions.
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the period after receipt and before redistribution on that portion of Fund
money and resource revenues received by the Regional Corporations which
must be redistributed under section 7(j) of ANCSA to their stockholders, the
class of their stockholders who are not village residents, and Village Corpo-
rations should not be taxable to the Regional Corporations.
2. The Applicability of Federal Securities Laws
The Claims Act requires the issuance of shares of stock by Regional Cor-
porations and business-for-profit Village Corporations to natives residing
within the native corporations' respective geographical areas. The authority of
the Regional and Village Corporations to issue stock raised obvious questions
about the applicability to such actions of the key federal securities statutes
-namely, the Securities Act of 1933," the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1
and the Investment Company Act of 1940.7"
Only the Investment Company Act of 1940 ever became a matter of active
concern for the native corporations.73 In 1974 the Securities and Exchange
Commission promulgated a temporary rule which, in granting the corpora-
tions a partial exemption from the requirements of the Act, made a number of
its provisions applicable." Furthermore, in late 1975 the Commission issued
notice of a proposed permanent rule which would have reduced drastically the
70. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1970).
71. Id. § 78a.
72. Id. § 80a-51.
73. On its face the 1933 Act does not apply to the native corporations. Only securities which
are offered or sold for "value"-i.e., those for which consideration has been given in exchange
-are subject to the provisions of the Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970). Since section 7 of
ANCSA appears to state that all eligible natives are entitled to receive one hundred shares of
stock, and the Claims Act contains no intimation that the Regional Corporation must, or even
may, be paid value for the securities issued, the 1933 Act is inapplicable. And since none of the
Village Corporations in fact received value for stock issued, the' are not subject to the require-
ments of the Act.
The legal relevance of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 remained an academic issue
because of the Securities and Exchange Commission's notion that the native corporations were
investment companies. The registration requirements of the Investment Act of 1940, rather than
those of the 1934 Act, were said to be applicable to such companies.
74. 17 C.F.R. § 270.6c-2 (1975) (Rule 6 c-2(T)). Specifically, the temporary rule provided the
following:
Any corporation organized pursuant to the [Claims Act] shall be temporarily exempt
from all provisions of the Act except Sections 8(a), 9. 17, 36, and 37 subject to the
following conditions: Any company claiming exemptions pursuant to this rule shall file
annually with the Commission copies of the reports required by section 7(o) of the Set-
tlement Act and shall maintain and keep current the accounts, books, and other docu-
ments relating to its business which constittite the record forming the basis for such
information and of the auditor's certification thereto.
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scope of the exemption contained in the temporary rule.7 5
The growing controversy over the applicability of the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940, however, was mooted by Congress' enactment in early
1976 of Public Law 94-204.7" The legislation amended the Claims Act to pro-
vide that any "corporation organized pursuant to [ANCSA] shall be exempt
from the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940 .. . the Sec-
urities Act of 1933 . . . and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . as
amended, through December 31, 1991."'1
C. Distributions of Land and Monetary Benefits
In view of the great stakes involved, the most numerous and by far the
most controversial issues which have arisen in the implementation of ANCSA
concern the proper allocation of land and money. Thus, major debates have
developed over the final regulations issued by the Secretary relating to land
selections by native corporations, departmental guidelines for the retention of
public use easements upon the lands selected, and the provisions of the
Claims Act governing the distribution of Fund monies and section 7(i) re-
source revenues.
1. Issues Relating to Land Selections and the Use of Native Lands
Section 11 (a) of the Claims Act 78 provides for the withdrawal from the
public lands of twenty-five townships around each native village 7 9 pending
selection by native corporations of the lands to which they are entitled. Sub-
section 1 l(a)(3) further provides that if the Secretary of the Interior deter-
mines that the lands withdrawn pursuant to subsections 1 1(a)(1) and (2) are
"insufficient," he "shall withdraw three times the deficiency from the nearest
unreserved, vacant and unappropriated public lands," and, in making any
75. Investment Company Act Release No. 8902 (Aug. 22, 1975) (proposed rule 6c-2); see 39
Fed. Reg. 8936 (1975).
76. Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-204. 89 Stat. 1145.
77. Act of Jan. 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-204, § 3, 89 Stat. 1147. The amendnent does require,
however, that
any . . . corporation which, but for this section, would be subject to the provisions of the
Securities Act of 1934 shall transmit to its stockholders each year a report containing
substantially all the information required to be included in an antiual report to stock-
holders by a corporation which is subject to the p)r osisions of such Act.
In a somewhat belated recognition of the broad exemption created by Public Law 94-204, the
Securities and Exchange Commission rescinded its proposed rule 6c-2 on February 6. 1976. See
Investment Company Act Release No. 9148 (Feb. 6, 1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 8342 (1976).
78. 43 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (Supp. IV. 1974).
79. Only nine townships were withdrawn around the ten villages of southeastern Alaska. See
id. § 1615(a).
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such deficiency withdrawal, he shall, "insofar as possible, withdraw public
lands of a character similar to those on which the village is located .... -. 80
Section 17(d)(2) of ANCSA, 8 1 on the other hand, also directs the Secretary to
withdraw up to eighty million acres of unreserved lands in Alaska for possible
inclusion in the National Park, Forest, Wildlife Refuge, and Wild and Scenic
Rivers Systems.
In setting aside lands under the Claims Act, the Secretary engaged in a
balancing act, and not all of the original deficiency withdrawals for the benefit
of natives ended up either close to the related village or similar in character
to the village lands. Most of the Regional Corporations, after subsequent
negotiations, managed to convince the Secretary to promulgate amended
withdrawals which were reasonably satisfactory. 82 With respect to his land
selection regulations and easement guidelines, though, the Secretary has
proved more obdurate.
a. Federal regulations implementing land selection procedures
established under section 12 of the Claims Act
Section 12(a)(1) of ANCSA provides that in the so-called "first round" vil-
lage land selections, "the Village Corporation for each Native village ... shall
select ... all of the township or townships in which any part of the village is
located, plus an area which will make the total selection equal to the acreage
to which the village is entitled under section 14."83 Section 12(a)(2) further
provides that "[s]elections made under ...subsection (a) shall be contiguous
and in reasonably compact tracts, except as separated by bodies of water or by
lands which are unavailable for selection, and shall be in whole sections and,
wherever feasible, in units of not less than 1,280 acres. '84 Section 12(b) of the
Claims Act, dealing with the second round village selections, on the other
hand, merely recites that each "Village Corporation shall select the acreage
allocated to it from the lands withdrawn by subsection 11 (a)." 85
On May 10, 1973, the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations 86 pur-
porting to implement sections 12(a) and 12(b) of ANCSA. Despite a number
of similarities between the Interior Department land selection regulations and
the corresponding provisions in ANCSA, the regulations implementing sec-
tions 12(a) and (b) differ from the statute in several important respects. First,
80. Id. § 1610(a)(3).
81. Id. § 1616(d)(2).
82. The major exception was Cook Inlet Region, Inc. which was unable to conclude satisfac-
tory negotiations with the Secretary. See Cook Inlet Region, Inc. v. Morton, Civil No. A-40-73 (D.
Alas., filed Feb. 20, 1975). Cook Inlet's situation, however, apparently was resolved in recent
legislation. See Act of January 2, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-204, § 12, 89 Stat. 1145, 1150.
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1611(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
84. Id. § 1611(a)(2).
85. Id. § 1611(b).
86. 43 C.F.R. § 2650.0-1 (1975).
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sections 2651.4(b) and (c) of the regulations impose on all village land selec-
tions certain restrictions to which only section 12(a) selections are subject
under the precise language of ANCSA. Section 2651.4(b), for example, re-
quires that selections under sections 12(a) and (b) satisfy "compactness" and
"contiguity" criteria, whereas section 12(a)(2) of the Claims Act makes these
criteria applicable only to the first round village land selections.
Second, the "compactness" requirement in the regulations is far more ex-
pansive than its statutory antecedent in the Claims Act. Section 2651.4(b) of
the regulations provides expressly that "the total area selected shall be reason-
ably compact . "..."87 By contrast, section 12(a)(2) of ANCSA requires only
that selections "made . . . shall be . . . in reasonably compact tracts . 8.. -88 In
other words, the Claims Act provides that land selections under section 12(a)
must be composed of a number of compact tracts, but a Village Corporation
is not compelled to choose lands in a manner which makes the total area
selected compact.
Finally, the Secretary's regulations add various restrictions to the land
selection process which appear nowhere in section 12 of the Claims Act.
Thus, section 2651.4(b) provides that a Village Corporation's land selection
shall not be considered "compact" if it excludes (1) "other lands available for
selection within its exterior boundaries," or (2) "lands which are similar in
character to the village site or lands ordinarily used by the village inhabitants
.... 8 Similarly, section 2652.3(c) of the regulations contains a direction,
unmentioned in ANCSA, that "[w]henever a regional selection is made in any
township, the regional corporation shall select all available lands in that town-
ship [i.e., up to 23,040 acres]." ''
The differences between the land selection limitations imposed by the
Claims Act and the restrictions imposed by the regulations are not mere tech-
nical distinctions, but have rather drastic practical implications for the Re-
gional and Village Corporations. Quite obviously, these corporations need
flexibility in selecting lands under ANCSA for resource and subsistence pur-
poses, while the deviations of the regulations from the Claims Act are aimed
at reducing that flexibility. As a consequence, several Regional and Village
Corporations filed suits challenging portions of the land selection
regulations. " Significantly, while he did not amend the regulations, the Sec-
retary settled this litigation by entering into stipulations which, through waiv-
87. Id. § 2651.4(b) (emphasis added).
88. 43 U.S.C. § 161 l(a)(2) (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis added).
89. 43 C.F.R. § 2651.4(b) (1975).
90. Id. § 26 52.3(c). This regulation and others relating to the Secretary's guidelines for land
selections by native corporations have been challenged on the ground that they are not au-
thorized by ANCSA. See Chugach Natives, Inc. v. Kleppe, Civil No. 75-2113 (D.D.C., filed Dec.
18, 1975).
91. Arctic Slope Regional Corp. v. Morton, Civil No. 73-1563 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 26, 1974);
Doyon, Ltd. v. Morton, Civil No. 74-1463 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 4, 1974).
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ers, accorded the native corporations all the latitude in making land selections
which they had initially sought and which the Claims Act seemed to provide.
b. The reservation of federal easements on lands
selected by native corporations
Out of the twenty-two substantive sections in ANCSA, twenty-one deal di-
rectly with the settlement of native claims and one-section 17-adopted at
the insistence of conservation organizations, deals more broadly with land use
planning in Alaska. Buried in the land use section is a provision authorizing
the Secretary of the Interior to reserve public easements upon lands patented
to Regional and Village Corporations. 9 2 Under date of July 8, 1975, the Sol-
icitor for the Department of the Interior issued an opinion which expresses
the view that the Secretary possesses a broad power to reserve public ease-
ments on native lands pursuant to section 17(b) of the Claims Act, and, more
particularly, that the Secretary's authority under subsection 17(b)(3) to deter-
mine which public easements are necessary is not limited to selecting among
the easements identified by the Land Use Planning Commission (LUPC)
under subsection 17(b)(1). 9 3 In addition, based upon his self-generated pre-
mise of broad secretarial power, the Solicitor further concluded that reserved
easements upon native lands are not restricted to the types of easements de-
scribed in subsection 17(b)(1) of the Claims Act.
The Solicitor is plainly wrong as a matter of law and of policy. In short,
subsection 17(b)(3) must be read in context, with that context being the total-
ity of ANCSA under which the United States, in exchange for the extin-
guishment of aboriginal claims to virtually all of Alaska, guaranteed the natives
clear title to some forty million acres of land. Congress would have been
guilty of a breach of faith if, as the Solicitor suggests, the Secretary were
authorized-under a subordinate provision in a section of ANCSA largely un-
related to the claims settlement-to override the dominant purpose of the
statute and carve out from the native lands (without payment of compensa-
tion) an unlimited number of easements for an unrestricted number of pub-
lic uses.9
4
92. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(b) (Supp. IV, 1974).
93. Ilnterior Dept't Sol. Op. NI-36880 (July 8. 1975), 82 Interior Dec. 325. On February 24,
1975, the Department of the Interior had circulated for comment proposed guidelines for im-
plementing section 17(b) of ANCSA which presupposed a broad authority in the Secretary to
reserve easements. LUPC and the natives challenged the validity of this assumption, and the later
Solicitor's opinion was issued in an obvious attempt to shore up the Secretary's position.
94. According to the Solicitor, -[s]ince Section 17(b)(3) is not the sole source of authority for
the Secretary to reserve easements, the scope of that authority must be discussed in the context of
his total authorits." Interior Dep't Sol. Op. M-36880, at I (July 8, 1975), 82 Interior Dec. 325.
Section 26 of the Claims Act provides, on the other hand, that "[tjo the extent that there is a
conflict between any provisions of this Act and any other Federal laws applicable to Alaska, the
provisions of this Act shall govern." 43 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV, 1974). Thus, to the extent that
the Secretary has other statutory powers---e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 932, 945 (1970)-to create easements
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As the prime basis for his position, the Solicitor points out that, while the
House version of the Claims Act 5 did not contain a land use section, section
24(d)(3) of the Senate bill9 6 did provide, in part, that "[p]rior to granting any
patent under this Act the Secretary shall consult with the Planning Commis-
sion and shall reserve such public easements as the Planning Commission has
identified and recommends." 7 In conference, the language requiring the
Secretary to reserve easements recommended by LUPC "was vigorously
opposed by the House members of the Conference Committee and by
the Executive Branch ,' 98 and eventually this language was dropped out of
the Claims Act. From this fact, the Solicitor finds a congressional intent
that the Secretary's authority be "broadened to look beyond the Planning
Commission and to make individual determinations on questions con-
cerning easements."
The Solicitor has misread ANCSA's legislative history. In eliminating the
mandatory aspect of easement reservations, Congress did not intend to
broaden the authority of the Secretary, but rather to lessen the authority of the
Planning Commission. In other words, instead of being required to reserve all
easements identified by LUPC, the Secretary was authorized under subsection
17(b)(3) of the Claims Act to pick and choose among the easements so iden-
tified in order to reserve only those he determines are necessary. Nothing in
ANCSA or in its legislative history supports the Solicitor's proposition that the
Conference Committee suddenly vested in the Secretary a broad authority to
reserve easements on native lands which he would not have possessed under
any previous version of the legislation.1 ""
Once the Secretary's authority to reserve easements is placed in correct
perspective, LUPC's power to identify such public easements assumes its
proper significance. Specifically, subsection 17(b)(1) of the Claims Act provides
that the easements identified by the Commission must be either: (1) "across
lands selected by Village Corporations and the Regional Corporations,"
or (2) "at periodic points along the courses of major waterways .... .'"" This
on lands in Alaska which are inconsistent with his powers under ANCSA, such statutes do not
add to his authority to reserve easements on native lands, but rather are inapplicable.
95. H.R. 10367, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
96. S. 35, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 24(d)(3) (1971).
97. Interior Dep't Sol. Op. M-36880, at 2-3 (July 8, 1975), 82 Interior Dec. -325 (emphasis
added).
98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 5.
100. Subsection 17(b)(2) required LUPC, in identifying public easements, to "consult with ap-
propriate State and Federal agencies," review "proposed transportation plaus," and "receive and
review statements and recommendations from interested organizations and individuals on the
need for and proposed location of public easements. ... 43 U.S.C. § 1616(b)(2) (Supp. IV,
1974). According to the Solicitor's interpretation of the statute, this congressionally directed activ-
ity is largely meaningless.
101. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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statutory language shows on its face that LUPC actually has little flexibility in
selecting the scope and location of the public easements which it will recom-
mend to the Secretary.
Thus, contrary to the Solicitor's assertion, 1 2 the Claims Act does not au-
thorize the Commission or the Secretary to reserve "site" easements on lands
to be patented to native corporations. Rather, it authorized easements across
native land selections'1 3 for such public purposes as "transportation, utilities,"
and access to adjoining state and federal lands "for recreation, hunting . . .
and such other public uses as the Planning Commission determines to be
important."' 1 14 Any other construction of the Claims Act would violate the
intent of Congress in ANCSA to convey lands to profit-making native corpo-
rations for their own use and development.
Whether the Secretary, notwithstanding the Solicitor's views, ultimately will
recognize the statutory limitations upon his authority to reserve easements
across native lands remains to be seen. 1115 If not, section 17(b) of ANCSA, like
so many other provisions of the Claims Act, will be headed for resolution in
102. Interior Dep't Sol. Op. M-36880, at 7 (July 8, 1975), 82 Interior Dec. 325. Citing a
number of state cases involving special circumstances, the Solicitor argues that "across" can mean
"over" or "on." Id. The Solicitor then argues on the basis of a reference to "recreation sites" and
"camp sites" in the Conference Report that the Secretary has authority "to reserve site easements
for [all] public uses . Id. Finally, the Solicitor argues that "public use" can extend to any
matter of "public health, recreation and enjoyment," id. at 6, the logical extension of this thesis
being that the Secretary can reserve an "easement" on native lands for a hospital or public build-
ing. The short answer to this bootstrap argument is that no evidence exists that Congress in-
tended so to define the Secretary's easement authority, and the plain language of the Claims Act
appears to the contrary.
103. This conclusion is supported by the Joint Statement of the Conference Committee on
ANCSA, which recites in part:
Subsection 17(b) of the conference report is substantially the same as Section 24(d) of
the Senate amendment. This stbsection provides for the advance reservation of ease-
ments and camping and recreation sites necessarv for public access across lands granted to
Village and Regional Corporations.
H.R. REP. No. 746, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1971) (emphasis added).
104. 43 U.S.C. § 1616(b)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). Similarly, with respect to access through water
transportation, subsection 17(b)(l) makes clear that LUPC should identify, and the Secretary may
reserve, easements only at 'periodic points" and only along 'major waterways." Thus, contrary to
the apparently prevailing view in the Department of the Interior, the Secretary does not have
authority to reserve "continuous shorelines easements," even though he may feel such easements
desirable for public travel. Draft memorandum from Royston C. Hughes, Chairman of the
Alaska Task Force to Jack 0. Horton, Assistant Secretary for Land and Water Resources 6-7,
Feb. 24, 1975. Furthermore, since a non-navigable body of water by definition does not constitute
a waterway, the Secretary's power can be exercised only in relation to the most important rivers
and lakes of Alaska.
105. Thus far, the Secretary, unfortunately, appears to be following the questionable legal
advice being provided by his solicitor. On February 12, 1976, the Secretary promulgated an order
relating to guidelines for local easements which, while departing from the Solicitor's recommen-
dations in some particulars, essentially reflects the approach he suggested. 41 Fed. Reg. 6295
(1976). On May 4, 1976, the Alaska Federation of Natives and six Regional Corporations filed
suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the Secretary's easement guidelines are in excess of his
authority under law. Calista Corp. v. Kleppe, Civil No. 76-0771 (D.D.C., May 4, 1976).
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the courts. Unfortunately, while any such litigation is pending, the issuance of
patents to the native corporations will be delayed and their use and develop-
ment of the land correspondingly deferred.
2. Problems Relating to the Distribution of Funds
A number of significant and controversial legal issues have arisen in con-
nection with the distribution of funds under provisions of the Claims Act to
the Regional and Village Corporations. First, at least one Regional Corpora-
tion has contended that it is not obligated to share with other corporations
section 7(i) resource revenues which are derived from lands not yet patented
to the resource-owning corporation.' Second, the Secretary of the Interior's
decision to exclude, for purposes of computing the amount of distributions
from the Alaska Native Fund to each Regional Corporation, natives residing
in "reservation" villages already has resulted in litigation. Finally, although not
yet an acute legal question, provisions in section 7(j) of ANCSA relating to
the distribution of funds by Regional Corporations to Village Corporations
and other designated distributees are likely to cause future controversy.
a. Distributions of section 7(i) resource revenues
Section 7(i) of ANCSA provides for the division of 70 per cent of all
timber and mineral revenues on an annual basis among twelve regional
corporations.t 7 Potentially, resource revenues will be a major source of in-
come for all the Regional Corporations and the proper construction of section
7(i), therefore, is a question of utmost concern.
1. The obligation of Regional Corporations to share benefits
received from the disposition of section 7(i) resources
prior to patenting of the land
The contention that a Regional Corporation is under no obligation to
share with other Regional Corporations benefits received from the disposition
of section 7(i) resources prior to patenting of the land seems a tenuous prop-
osition at best. To permit a resource-rich Regional Corporation to dispose of
substantial rights in its subsurface resources before the land has been
selected-an event over which only the resource-owning Regional Corporation
106. At least nine of the Regional Corporations entered into agreements covering the explo-
ration and development of oil, gas, and other minerals underlying lands in their regions-even
though the lands involved in the agreements had not yet been patented to the respective corpora-
tions. The legal question posed in this part of the article was clarified in Aleut Corp. v. Arctic
Slope Regional Corp., Civil No. 75-53 (D. Alas., filed July 9, 1976). and Doyon, Ltd. v. NANA
Regional Corp., Civil No. 74-1531 (D.D.C., filed May 5, 1976), which held that section 7(i) rex-
enues were not exempt from the sharing requirement merely because no formal patent had been
issued on the land containing the resources.
107. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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would have control-and then retain the consideration paid because the land
has not yet been patented, would frustrate the overriding congressional pur-
pose of assuring all natives a fair share of the wealth.
Other provisions in the Claims Act indicate that Congress limited dis-
tributable resources- to "timber resources and [the] subsurface estate patented
to it"108 only because Congress did not anticipate that Regional Corporations
would have the ability to derive revenues from withdrawn land prior to
patenting. By explicitly affirming, in section 22(i),' 0 9 the Secretary of the
Interior's power to administer land withdrawn for native selection "prior to
conveyance," Congress established that the Regional Corporations could not
effectively dispose of legal interests in such property. In short, in agreements
disposing of section 7(i) resources, Regional Corporations have not sold rights
in withdrawn land, which section 22(i) of ANCSA gives the Secretary exclu-
sive authority to do, but rather have negotiated a present sale of future in-
terests, the subsurface resources in lands which will be "patented to it."''11
Furthermore, nothing in the land selection regulations issued by the Secretary
to implement the Claims Act lends any support to the argument that a Re-
gional Corporation can dispose of property rights in withdrawn lands apart
from the resources ultimately to be "patented to it.""'
108. Id. § 1606(i). A reasonable construction of the phrase is that it probably was intended
by Congress to identify what lands were subject to the distribution requirements of section 7(i)
rather than when such requirements became applicable. In other words, only lands patented to
the native corporation under ANCSA would be affected by section 7(i). Those lands acquired in
some other fashion-such as by purchase-would not be.
109. Id. § 1621(i).
110. Section 10(d) of H.R. 10367, the House bill from which section 22(i) of ANCSA was
drawn, provided "for the continuation of present management" of withdrawn land "until the
land is either patented or returned to its use prior to withdrawal." H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong..
1st Sess. 27 (1971). The Conference Committee rejected the provisions of section 16(b) in the
Senate bill, S. 35, which would have sharply limited the powers of the Secretary in administering
withdrawn lands in order to enhance native rights. S. REP. No. 405, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 36,
145-46 (1971).
The principle that a Regional Corporation possesses no legally recognizable interest in with-
drawn lands which can be transferred independently of its rights in patented lands is confirmed
in the Secretary of the Interior's land selection regulations. See 43 C.F.R. § 2650 (1975). Section
2650.1(a)(2)(i) of Title 43 of the Code of Federal Regulations, for example, which deals with the
"interim administration" of lands withdrawn in aid of native land selections, specifically provides
that, prior to conveyance under the Claims Act, the Secretary need only obtain and consider "the
views of the concerned regions or villages" before making contracts or issuing leases with respect
to the land. In a similar vein, sections 2650.4-2 and 2650.4-3 declare, respectively, that upon
issuance of a patent to a Regional Corporation, 'the grantee thereunder shall succeed and be-
come entitled to any and all interests . . .of the United States as lessor" but prior leases "shall
continue to be administered .. .by the United States after the conveyance has been issued, unless
the responsible agency waives administration." 43 C.F.R. §§ 2650.4-2, 2650.4-3 (1975).
111. The validity of this conclusion can best be illustrated by referring to one of the agree-
ments which is at issue in Doyon, Ltd. v. NANA Regional Corp., Civil No. 74-1531 (D.D.C., filed
May 5, 1976). Under an agreement entered into with NANA, Standard Oil Company of California
will have exclusive rights of prospecting and exploration in those "lands and/or subsurface estates
within the NANA Region, subject to selection by NANA, the Village Corporations, Native Groups
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2. The manner in which an accounting for section 7(1)
resources should be rendered
Before a Regional Corporation can share section 7(i) resource revenues
with other Regional Corporations, accounting guidelines governing such dis-
tributions will have to be established. Following established legal authority the
word "revenues," which is left undefined in section 7(i), should be construed
broadly to include all compensation for the disposition of rights and interests
in subsurface resources, regardless of whether such consideration assumes the
form of cash payments, goods, services or benefits, which would not have
been received but for the section 7(i) transaction.' 12
Moreover the Claims Act and its legislative history'' 3 offer rather compel-
and individual Natives . . . pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act." Exploratory
Option Agreement Between NANA Regional Corporation. Inc. and Standard Oil Company of
California 1, January 17, 1973 (unpublished document on file with authors). Standard obviously
will derive benefits under its agreement with NANA solely from those lands and subsurface
estates which actually are patented to NANA. Indeed, patenting or interim conveyance of the
land to NANA is a condition precedent to the lease by Standard. Exploratory Option Agreement,
supra at 5-6. This language in the contract leads rather ineltctably to the conclusion that the
consideration paid by companies such as Standard to Regional Corporations wishing to dispose of
their mineral resources is attributable directly to patented land and is encoompassed within section
7(i) of ANCSA.
112. Numerous legal authorities have interpreted the terin -reventies" to include a wNide vari-
ety of benefits. Moreover, courts have stated on repeated occasions that revenues inclttde income.
See Donald v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 S.C. 7, 15, 20 S.E.2d 395, 398-99 (1942); 1Trefry v.
Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 529, 116 N.E. 904, 908 (1917). The tert "in(otie" has been interpreted
to encompass not only money or cash payments, but also serices w\hic h have value to the recip-
ient. See generally J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 6.05, at 28 (1974). Viewed in
realistic economic terms, revenues received in the form of (ash benefits are indistinguishable
from benefits received in the form of rights or services. Both types of benefit constitute good
consideration, and, assuming all parties to the transaction are fully knowledgeable about market
prices, the amourilt of any cash payments promised for the acquisition of interests in land will
fluctuate in direct relationship to the valtre of any required payments in kinl.
Moreover. the broad construction of the term "'reventies" w\hich is described above has been
adopted by courts which have been called upon to interpret the w\ord within the context of
ANCSA. In Aleut Corp. v. Arctic Slope Regional Corp., Civil No. 75-53 (D. Alas., filed July 9,
1976), and Doyon, Ltd. v. NANA Regional Corp.. Civil No. 74-1531 (D.D.C., filed Mav 5. 1976).
the court confirmed the proposition that the terim "reventues" in section 7(i) should be construed
in a liberal manner to include all fornus of consideration whitl) Would not have been received but
for the section 7(i) transaction.
113. Section 9(j)(1) of the Senate version of the Claims Act speaks in terms of "net proceeds,"
rather than "gross revenues." S. 35, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 9(j)(l) (1971). See a/so S. REP. No. 405.
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 120. 125 (1971). Nor is a contrar interpretation of "all reventues" required
by the legislative history of the original House version of section 7(i) of the Claims Act. Section
6(g) of H.R. 10367 contained the follows'ing provisions:
All reventes received by each corporation from the subsurface estate patented pursuant
to this Act shall be divided by the corporation anuong all twelve regional corporations
organized pursuant to this section according to the ntmber of Natives enrolled in each
region pursuant to sectioi 5.
H.R. 10367, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6(g) (1971) (emphasis added). The House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs explained that this provision was included in the bill to guarantee
that all natives would "benefit equally ftrom any minerals discovered within a particular region."
H.R. REP. No. 523, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1971). Leaving aside the 1uestion of whether ANCSA
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
ling evidence that when Congress referred to the distribution of "all rev-
enues" from timber and subsurface resources it meant net, rather than gross,
revenues. If the term were defined as gross revenues, the Claims Act would
reduce significantly the incentive of any Regional Corporation to develop "the
timber resources and subsurface estate patented to it.""'  No statutory provi-
sion exists for the sharing of expenses among Regional Corporations, and all
development costs, therefore, would be charged against the resource-owning
Regional Corporation's retained 30 per cent-perhaps even to the extent of
exceeding it. Furthermore, since the productive use of a natural resource
necessarily entails some expenses on the part of the owner-if no more than
the cost of negotiating and administering a lease-the conclusion that "all rev-
enues" means "gross revenues" would violate the 70-30 split between the
twelve Regional Corporations and the resource-owning Regional Corporation
which Congress established.' ' 5
A determination must also be made for accounting purposes of what con-
stitutes allowable deductions to arrive at net proceeds. Allowable deductions
should encompass all reasonable charges which are legitimately incurred by
the resource-owning Regional Corporation to obtain or retain section 7(i) rev-
enues. As a matter of fairness, such costs properly could include: (a) all busi-
ness expenses (as that term is defined in the Internal Revenue Code) in-
curred in the development or production of a section 7(i) resource; (b) all
direct administrative costs related to the production of section 7(i) revenues,
plus a reasonable allocation of other overhead; and (c) a fair share of pre-
development costs, including aitortization of land selection costs relating to
timber and the subsurface estate which have not otherwise been classed as
business expenses.
In addition, a Regional Corporation should not be permitted to use a de-
pletion deduction or income taxes as offsets against its section 7(i) revenues.
The deduction of a depletion allowance and income taxes would represent in
the first instance the insertion into the section 7(i) distributions formula of tax
concepts which are unrelated to actual receipts. Furthermore, the disallow-
ance of such deductions guarantees that the distribution of section 7(i) rev-
enues wvill not be affected by the resource-owning corporation's tax situation,
actually achieved this objective, the Committee could not possibly have intended that "all rev-
enues" mean "gross revenues," since such a construction would result in obviously dispro-
portionate distributions, with the patentee Regional Corporation's absorbing all expenses, while
the other Regional Corporations reap benefits without cost.
114. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i) (Supp. IV, 1974).
115. In Doyon, Ltd. v. NANA Regional Corp.. Civil No. 74-1531 (D.D.C., filed Ma, 5, 1976),
the court held in substance that the phrase "'all revenues" in section 7(i) connoted a *'net" rather
than "gross" concept. The theory of net revenues adopted by the court, however, is quite restric-
tive, and would not permit the deduction of overhead or direct administrative costs related to the
production of section 7(i) income, or a share of land selection costs attributable to timber and the
smtbsiirfae estate
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and the 70-30 split of resource revenues mandated by Congress, therefore,
will be carried out in terms of real dollars.
Revenues attributable to timber and subsurface resources, and thus subject
to section 7(i) distributions, should, moreover, be calculated on the basis of
the value of the resource in place. Any other formula would have to reflect
gains or losses from business operations, and such an approach involves more
than resource revenue sharing.
In the case of passive development, such as the sale of standing timber or
a standard oil and gas lease, a rebuttable presumption should exist that the
contract price or royalty payment constitutes the fair market value of the re-
source in place. Where active development by the Regional Corporation oc-
curs, such as production through a subsidiary or joint venture or the receipt
of non-cash consideration, a determination of the revenue attributable exclu-
sively to the resource will become more difficult, and appropriate accounting
procedures may have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis. Finally, in the
event a Regional Corporation sells property outright, and the property sold is
a subsurface interest or land having a highest and best use for timber opera-
tions, a rebuttable presumption should exist that the sales price represents the
fair market value of these resources. The opposite rebuttable presumption
should apply if the land is without trees or has no known mineral values.
A Regional Corporation's accounting for section 7(i) revenues also will be
determined in part by the nature of the duty a resource-owning corporation
owes to other Regional Corporations in its disposition of section 7(i) re-
sources. The relationships among the native corporations created under the
Claims Act are unique and, in terms of legal responsibilities, largely un-
clarified, but the resource-owning Regional Corporation certainly appears to
owe no greater duty to the other Regional Corporations than it does to its
own stockholders. Such a standard is further justified by the fact that it con-
flicts with no provision of the Claims Act, the basic rules that govern such a
relationship are well-defined and easily applied, and there is no inconvenience
in maintaining the same standard for intercorporate relations as for
manager-stockholder relations.
Assuming a resource-owning Regional Corporation's duties to other Re-
gional Corporations are the same as those which a corporation owes to its
stockholders, then the native corporation distributing section 7(i) revenues is
not required to obtain the consent of, or to advise, other Regional Corpora-
tions before it enters into agreements disposing of section 7(i) resources.
Courts consistently have adhered to the general rule that "the board of direc-
tors, and not the stockholders, controls the conduct of the corporation's busi-
ness, and necessarily controls the corporation's property with reference to all
matters within and incidental to such business."'"" This legal rubric often has
116. Hanrahan v. Anderson, 108 Mont. 218, 231. 90 P.2d 494, 499 (1939); accord, Fontaine v.
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been applied for the specific purpose of rejecting stockholders' claims that
corporate property had been disposed of without their consent, 1 7 and the
distributee Regional Corporations can advance no justification for claiming
superior rights.""8
Finally, section 7(i) of the Claims Act provides explicitly that distributions
are to be mnade on an "annual" basis.'' At the end of any given year, the
amounts which a resource-owning Regional Corporation must pay over to all
twelve Regional Corporations are determinable, and the failure of the
resource-owning corporation to make payments promptly means that it is re-
taining the use of funds belonging to others. Thus, in the absence of agree-
ment to the contrary among the Regional Corporations, the resource-owvning
corporation could logically be found liable to pay interest upon distributable
funds from the end of its fiscal year to the date of distribution.
As a practical matter, however, the accountants for the Regional Corpora-
tions wvill not be able to calculate section 7(i) revenues for some time after the
close of the fiscal year, and, in recognition of this fact, the resource-owning
corporation probably should not be required to pay interest on distributable
amounts unless it fails to distribute such funds to the other Regional Corpora-
tions within a reasonable period-thirty days, for example-after the end of
the fiscal year in which the section 7(i) revenues are or were received.
b. The exclusion of natives residing in "reservation" villages for
purposes of making distributions to regional corporations
from the Alaska Native Fund
In addition to issues relating to the distribution of section 7(i) resource
revenues, -a serious question also has arisen concerning the exclusion, for
purposes of making distributions to Regional Corporations from the Alaska
Native Fund, of those natives who resided in villages which elected "to acquire
title to the surface and subsurface estate in any reserve set aside for the[ir]
Brown County Motors Co.. 251 Wis. 433, 437-38, 29 N.W.2d 744, 747 (1947). See also ALASKA
SrAT. § 10.05.174 (1968).
117. See. e.g.. McCloskey v. New Orleans Brewing Co., 128 La. 197, 203-04, 54 So. 738, 740
(1911).
118. The Claims Act appears to contain no provisions which would indicate that resource-
owning Regional Corporations are required to adhere to a more rigorous standard-such as that
which normally is imposed on trustees. Congress made clear in section 2(b) of the Claims Act that
the settlement of aboriginal claims "should be accomplished rapidly ... without creating a reser-
vation system or lengthy wardship or trusteeship . 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). No
provision elsewhere in ANCSA indicates that Congress intended the Regional Corporations to
possess in relation to each other a status which was denied the Secretary of the Interior. Fur-
thermore, section 7(i) places no obligation upon a resource-owning Regional Corporation *'pru-
dently" to develop the "timber resources and subsurface estate patented to it," and such language
is employed to define the duty of a statutory trustee. See generally United States Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Sullivan. 69 F.2d 412, 415 (7th Cir. 1934).
119. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(i) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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use,"t 20 rather than participate in the regular land selection procedures of the
Act. In determining a Regional Corporation's share of Section 6(c) monies,
the Secretary has excluded the native residents of such villages on the ground
that when Congress employed the phrase "natives enrolled in each region"
2
'
to describe eligibility, it actually meant "stockholders in each Regional Corpo-
ration." Furthermore, he argued, any other action would result in an "unjus-
tified disparity of benefits among the stockholders of the various regional
corporations which cannot be rationally supported." 22
The exclusion of reservation villagers is questionable on several grounds.
23
The status of reservation villager and "enrolled Native" are not mutually
exclusive categories. The term "Native" is defined in section 3(b) of ANCSA
in part as follows: 124
"Native" means a citizen of the United States who is a person of one-
fourth degree or more Alaska Indian (including Tsimshian Indians not en-
rolled in the Netlaktla [sic] Indian Community) Eskimo, or Aleut blood, or
combination thereof . . . Any decision of the Secretary regarding eligibility
for enrollment shall be final ....
The definition of "Native" in the Claims Act, therefore, does not exclude
natives residing in reservation villages, and, indeed, makes no reference, ex-
plicit or implicit, to the necessity for eliminating such natives from the pop-
120. /d. § 1618(b).
121. After completion of the roll prepared pursuant to section 5, all money in the Fund
• . . shall be distributed at the end of each three months of the fiscal year among the
Regional Corporations organized pursuant to section 7 o the basis of the relative
numbers of Natives enrolled in each region.
Id. § 1606(i).
122. Letter from Kent Frizzell, Solicitor of the Department of the Interior to Arthur Lazarus,
Jr. 2, Sept. 25. 1974. The specific Regional Corporations which have been prejudiced by the
Secretary's determination are Doyon, Limited and Bering Straits Native Corporation. Specifically,
if the Secretary had included natives residing in reservation villages for purposes of calculating
these corporations* shares of Fund distributions, Doyon would have been paid approximately
$735,000 more and Bering Straits would have been paid about $3,170,000 more by the end of
September 1975. (No further distributions have been made since that date.) Furthermore, on the
basis of the Secretary's September 17, 1974 population figures, failure to count residents of the
section 19(b) villages among the numbers of natives enrolled in each of these regions for pur-
poses of section 6(c) ultimatelv will cost Doyon over $2,900,000 and Bering Straits almost
$12,500,000 in total distributions out of the Fund.
123. In 1974 Doyon, Limited and Bering Straits Native Corporation, the two Regional Corpo-
rations prejudiced by the Secretary's decision, brought suit to challenge its legality. See Doyon,
Ltd. v. Morton, Civil No. 74-1463 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 4, 1974). On May 13, 1975, the action,
which originally was filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia, was transferred to
the District of Alaska. See Doyon, Ltd. v. Hathaway, Civil No. 75-89 (D. Alas., transferred May
13, 1975). On July 9, 1976, the District Court for the District of Alaska, in an opinion based
largely on the same reasoning which is discussed below, held that the Secretary of the Interior
had acted illegally in excluding, for purposes of making distributions from the Fund, natives
enrolled in section 19(b) villages.
124. 43 U.S.C. § 1602(b) (Supp. lV, 1974). An identical definition of the word "Native" ap-
pears in the regulations which have been issued to implement section 3 of the Claims Act. 25
C.F.R. § 43h-l(g) (1975).
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ulation count under section 6(c).' 2 5 Indeed, the fact that, in another provi-
sion 126 dealing with the revocation of existing reservations, Congress expressly
declared members of the Metlakatla Indian Community to be ineligible for
benefits, but made no similar declaration with respect to the native residents
of reservation villages, indicates that Congress intended that the native resi-
dents of villages which elected to acquire title to their reserves pursuant to
section 19(b) would remain classified as "Natives" under the provisions of the
Claims Act.
Reservation villagers are also clearly "enrolled" natives for purposes of the
Act. The Secretary has promulgated a roll of Alaska Natives which shows the
natives residing in reservation villages as being enrolled in their respective
regions, 12 7 and such natives, therefore, quite literally are "Natives enrolled" in
these regions within the meaning of section 6(c).' 28
The plain meaning of the words in section 6(c) therefore dictate that Fund
distributions be made on the basis of all "Natives enrolled in each region,"
including the residents of reservation villages. Even assuming the language of
section 6(c) were ambiguous, a close analysis of ANCSA renders somewhat
dubious the Secretary's assertion that Congress intended to say "stockholders
in each Regional Corporation" when it actually said "Natives enrolled in each
region." It is clear from an analysis of other provisions in the Act that, when
Congress wanted to use the word "stockholder," it had no difficulty in doing
so. 12 9 The absence of the term from section 6(c) leads to the conclusion that
Congress intended what it said-namely, that monies from the Fund should
be distributed on the basis of the relative numbers of natives enrolled in the
respective regions.
125. Nor for that matter does section 3(b) purport to exclude native residents of section 19(b)
villages from the definition of "Native" for any other purpose. Section 19(b) stipulates that, in the
event a village elects to acquire title to its reserve, "the enrolled residents of the Village Corpora-
tion shall not be eligible to receive Regional Corporation stock." Section 19(b) does not provide
that residents of reservation villages no longer shall be considered "Natives," and such individuals
remain subject to all other provisions of ANCSA relating to natives and Native Corporations. See,
e.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1607(c), 1617, 1620(d) (Supp. IV, 1974).
126. 43 U.S.C. § 1618(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
127. Every native is enrolled in a region. Id. § 1604(b). If the native residents of the reserva-
tion villages were not listed on the Secretary's roll, they would not have been eligible to form a
Village Corporation under section 8 of ANCSA or to conduct an election under section 19(b). Id.
§§ 1607, 1618(b).
128. Under the Claims Act, a "decision of the Secretary regarding eligibility for enrollment
shall be final." Id. §§ 1602(b), 1604(a).
129. Thus, section 7(j) directs the Regional Corporations for five years to distribute not less
than 10 per cent of the benefits derived by them under sections 6(c) and 7(i) "among the
stockholders of the twelve Regional Corporations." 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j) (Supp. IV, 1974) (emphasis
added). Furthermore, section 7(k) provides that funds distributed by Regional Corporations
among Village Corporations shall be divided on the basis of the relative'numbers of stockholders.
Id. § 1606(k). Finally, section 7(m) establishes a formula for determining the manner in which
certain funds will be distributed among those Regional Corporation stockholders who are not
residents of a village. Id. § 1606(m).
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Finally, consideration must be given to the Secretary of the Interior's as-
sertion that, if taken literally, the language of section 6(c) would result in an
"unjustified disparity of benefits among the stockholders of the various
regional corporations." To state the Secretary's conclusion conversely, the
Claims Act purportedly requires close to mathematical equality in the dis-
tribution of benefits among the various Regional Corporations.
An objective reading of ANCSA reveals a number of instances in which
Congress, for a variety of reasons, did not provide that the stockholders of all
Regional Corporations were to share the benefits of the claims settlement
equally. First, the thirteenth Regional Corporation is not eligible to share in
resource revenues pursuant to section 7(i) and is not permitted to make land
selections under section 12.') Furthermore, section 7(j) of the Act establishes
a minimum percentage for payments by the thirteenth Regional Corporation
to its stockholders out of Fund distributions which differs from the minimum
statutory requirement for other Regional Corporations.' 3
Second, Sealaska, the Regional Corporation for southeastern Alaska, is not
eligible for land selections under section 12 of ANCSA.' 3 2 Moreover, the na-
tive villages in southeastern Alaska, regardless of size, are limited to owner-
ship of only one township, and thus, on a per shareholder basis, Sealaska's
subsurface entitlement is markedly lower than the entitlement of the other
eleven Regional Corporations, whose villages may select from three to seven
townships, depending upon their size."' Congress also allowed Sealaska's
stockholders to retain, without debit against distributions from the Alaska Na-
tive Fund,' 34 the judgment of $7,546,053.80 for the loss of aboriginal lands
entered by the Court of Claims in Tlingit and Haida Indians v. United States '3 5
and appropriated by Congress in 1968."3'
Third, section 12(c) of the Claims Act contains a complex land-loss for-
mula which will result in an unequal distribution of land among the Regional
Corporations. 3 7 In general, Congress directed that sixteen million acres of
land would be allocated among some, but not all eleven, eligible Regional
Corporations on the basis of the relative amounts of land to which claims
were being relinquished by the natives within each region, regardless of the
size of each region's native population. In fact, only six Regional Corporations
qualify for section 12(c) land selections. Thus, the fair market values of stock
in the various Regional Corporations, calculated on the basis of total assets
130. Id. §§ 1606(i), 1611.
131. Id. § 1606(j).
132. Id. § 1611.
133. Id. §§ 1613, 1615.
134. Id. § 1615(c).
135. 389 F.2d 778 (Ct. CI. 1968).
136. Act of July 9, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-392, 82 Stat. 307.
137. 43 U.S.C. § 1611(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
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-land as well as funds-will and were intended to differ materially.
Finally, as previously pointed out, section 7(i) of ANCSA provides that
each Regional Corporation may keep 30 per cent of the revenues received
from its timber resources and subsurface estate, and that 70 per cent of such
revenues shall be divided annually among all twelve Regional Corporations.138
This feature of the Act clearly creates a bonus for the stockholders of
resource-rich Regional Corporations, like the Arctic Slope Native Corpora-
tion, which, on a per shareholder basis, will receive a far larger portion of
resource revenues than the other Regional Corporations.
In summary, a number of observations can be offered with respect to the
Secretary of the Interior's decision to eliminate natives residing in reservation
villages from his calculations for purposes of determining the appropriate
shares of the Regional Corporations in Fund distributions. First, such natives
unquestionably are natives enrolled in their respective regions and, based
upon the plain language of the Claims Act, their exclusion by the Secretary
seems erroneous. Secondly, though Congress may have been motivated by the
concept that all natives would receive a fair share of benefits distributed
under ANCSA, the law as written does not in fact achieve anything approach-
ing mathematical equality in the allocation of benefits. Finally, section 6(c) is
yet another portion of the Claims Act which, instead of facilitating smooth
administration of the settlement, has tended to cause conflict among the Reg-
ional Corporations and the dissipation of their money and energy in thankless
litigation.
c. The distribution of funds under section 7(j) of the Claims Act
Perhaps the most crucial legal problem presented by ANCSA for future
years is the construction of section 7(j). This section of the Claims Act
provides: 139
(j) During the fie years following the enactment of this Act, not less than
10% of all corporate funds received by each of the twelve Regional Corpora-
tions under section 6 (Alaska Native Fund), and under subsection (i) (re-
venues from the timber resources and subsurface estate patented to it pur-
suant to this Act), and all other net income, shall be distributed among the
stockholders of the twelve Regional Corporations. Not less than 45% of funds
from such sources during the first five-vear period, and 50% thereafter, shall
be distributed among the Village Corporations in the region and the class of
stockholders who are not residents of those villages, as provided in subsection
to it [sic].
The specific issue posed by section 7(j) is whether the Regional Corpora-
tions must distribute 45 per cent of their "other net income" during the first
five year period following enactment of ANCSA and 50 per cent thereafter
138. Id. § 1606(i).
139. Id. § 1606(j).
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among the Village Corporations and the class of stockholders who are not
village residents. This question does not involve simply the division of money
betweeen Regional and Village Corporations. The answer to the question in
all likelihood will determine whether the Regional Corporations can survive as
profit-making institutions, since any corporation which must give away 50 per
cent of its "net income" and at the same time pay taxes upon 100 per cent of
its income will operate at a perpetual deficit. 4 ° The issue turns on whether
the phrase "from such sources," which appears in the second sentence of the
section, includes as one of its antecedents the term "all other net income,"
which appears in the first sentence of the section, or refers only to funds
received as resource revenues or from the Alaska Native Fund.
Read and considered carefully, section 7(j) on its face appears more sus-
ceptible to the interpretation that the phrase "from such sources" was not
intended to encompass the net earnings of Regional Corporations. The an-
tecedents for the phrase, which are found in the first sentence, are "funds
received .. .under section 6 (Alaska Native Fund) and under subsection (i)
(revenues from timber resources and subsurface estate patented to it pursuant
to this act) .... .141 The term "all other net income," which also appears in
the first sentence, is not used subordinately to "funds," but instead is a sepa-
rate category of money subject to distribution only under the 10 per cent
formula.
The legislative history of section 7(j) also lends support to the proposition
that Congress did not intend the Regional Corporations to distribute 45 to 50
per cent of their earnings and profits from business investments to Village
Corporations and village nonresidents. In the Conference Report on the bill
which became ANCSA, the Committee commented with respect to section
7(j):1 42
Each Regional Corporation must distribute among the Village Corpora-
tions in the region not less than 50 percent of its share of the $962,500,000
grant, and 50 percent of all revenues received from the subsurface estate. This
provision does not apply to revenues received by the Regional Corporations from their
investment in business activities.
140. Applying the federal corporate income tax rate (including Surtax) )f 48 per cent. 26
U.S.C. § 1] (1970), and the Alaska ctorporate income tax rate (includiln*soUrtax) of 9.4 per cent,
CCH STATE IAx HANDBOOK [ 220] 10 (1975). each Regional Corporation will pay out over
one-half its net income in taxes.
If "net income," as used in section 7(j) of ANCSA, were defined to mean "net income after
taxes," or if an\ distibutions mandated by section 7 (j) \,,ere deemed a deduction ftrom income
before calculation of taxes, then the Regional Corporations, of course, would not be legally obli-
gated to pay out over 100 per cent of their income. The corporations, however, still Would not
have sufficient income-apart frot retained section 7(i) revenues-to pay reasonable dividends to
theit stockholders or to use as working capital in new ventures.
141. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(j) (Supp. IV, 1974).
142. H.R. RfP. No. 746, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 36 (1971) (emphasis added).
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Finally, no legitimate reason exists for requiring Regional Corporations to
pay out 50 per cent of their net income to Village Corporations and village
nonresidents. Congress intended all natives and native corporations to share
in the monetary settlement effected by ANCSA, so the allocation of Fund
distributions provided in section 7(j) appears entirely appropriate. Similarly,
title to all subsurface resources is vested in the Regional Corporations pur-
suant to the Claims Act, so the sharing of section 7(i) revenues also seems
logical. The Village Corporations, however, are under no obligation to split
their net income from business activities with the Regional Corporations, and
no economic justification can be found in the Claims Act for saying the Re-
gional Corporations must share comparable income with the Village
Corporations. 143
CONCLUSION
This article has described and analyzed the major issues which have arisen
to date in the operation of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971.
Briefly summarized, the enactment of ANCSA marked the successful conclu-
sion of the Alaska Natives' long quest for a settlement of their aboriginal land
claims, but passage of the Claims Act also has signaled the beginning of a
period during which natives will face a host of new and difficult legal prob-
lems in implementing the complex, unique, and often ambiguous settlement
scheme created by Congress. Moreover, in their efforts to make ANCSA
work, the natives are encountering with increasing frequency not only a lack
of support from the concerned federal agencies, but also divisions within their
own ranks. In a very real sense, therefore, the complete and final settlement
intended by Congress, and for which the natives have strived, still lies many
years in the future.
A study of the Claims Act should not conclude without mention of the
most serious practical problem inherent in its provisions. Assuming a native
population of approximately 80,000, the typical Village Corporation having
143. The third sentence in section 7(j), which provides that. -[i]n the case of the thirteenth
Regional Corporation, if organized, not less than 50% of all corporate funds received under
section 6 shall be distributed to the stockholders" also gives support for the conclusion that the
phrase "from such sources' does not include the net income of Regional Corporations. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1606(j) (Supp. IV, 1974). This provision for the thirteenth Regional Corporation is the coun-
terpart of the provision for the other twelve Regional Corporations contained in the second sen-
tence. In other words, the thirteenth Regional Corporation is not entitled to share in section 7(i)
resource revenues, but is entitled to distributions from the Fund. Other than taking into account
this difference between the thirteenth and the other twelve Regional Corporations, the third
sentence of section 7(j) imposes substantially the same distribution requirement upon the former
as the second sentence imposes upon the latter. Nonetheless, without mention of income, the
third sentence requires only the distribution of 50 per cent of Ftincd moneys received by the
thirteenth Regional Corporation, and if Congress intended to require the twelve Regional Corpo-
rations to distribute income under the second sentence of section 7 (j), the Claims Act would have
required the thirteenth Regional Corporation to do the same tinder the third sentence.
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150 shareholders is entitled to receive in distributions from the Alaska Native
Fund about $433,000 in appropriated funds over an eleven year period (an
average of less than $40 thousand annually) and an additional $468,750 from
the two per cent royalty (section 9) over an indefinite period, or a total of
about $900 thousand. In the Alaskan economy, particularly as inflated by the
current pipeline construction boom, this income flow is hardly sufficient to
pay full-time corporate staff, much less provide the cash needed for business
investments or community improvement. This capital shortage obviously can
be made up only if the natives' subsurface resources begin at an early date to
produce substantial revenues. For the ordinary village resident, therefore, the
legal nuances of ANCSA are largely irrelevant, and it is the land for which
they fought so fiercely which ultimately will determine whether ANCSA rep-
resents a dream or a delusion.
